![]() They will sand off markings and apply new ones, sometimes to compatible chips sometimes to completely different functions.Īgain - the complaint is missing significant details to determine any of this but, were I to be looking, the age and the end-of-life production status would be among the first questions I'd ask.Īir Force discloses procurement fraud probe, provides few details ![]() Worse, when the order for a long-obsolete component goes out it's clear that there is no available substitute and the buyer will spend whatever is necessary short of being a full-redesign and qualification. Not too bad at 1-5 years, but come 10-20 years and the rate at which antiques are available gets spotty. To be known to be reliable for the task a chip is typically on the market for some time, but often this positions them close to end of life, This runs up against a 20-30 year support life requirement and if the board maker doesn't manage a life-time-buy for all the parts they might ever need they start to get pushed to the open market. The main problem from electrical component counterfeits is old designs that are qualified with certain components. The fact that this sort of investigation isn't mentioned for the crash unit is perplexing, especially in view of the suggestion there was tampering and counterfeiting. If one is interested in such things, Ken Shirriff has a web site dedicated to identifying and reverse engineering microchips and older circuits and sometimes discovering counterfeits. It certainly seems that whatever was done was of such a level of incompetency that one must assume the original configuration was not fit for purpose. If so, then it's not possible to prove the original components in place during the accident/crash were counterfeits. The main argument seems to be that the circuit board had several components removed in crude fashion and then replaced with counterfeits after the crash. It's really unclear from the indicated events what the f' happened to that board. I would hope that percent symbol is a typo. "The USAF set the DRS’s system reliability requirement at 0.999%" I also found it interesting that his credentials got him through MoD security and he was given unaccompanied access to the site. Asked for provenance, etc., he walked away. (Which the Service obviously couldn't calculate, although to be fair they'd got rid of the posts who knew how to work an abacus). ![]() Obviously tracking what was being bought and, impressively, how many we SHOULD have been buying. The inevitable complaints about lack of support came in, but what amazed me was how quickly a company in the US sent across a rep offering me 4 'second-hand' systems immediately, for a 10th of the new cost. The Service said 10 will do, and that's what funding the IFF office was given. At least 24 required to meet the policy, and there would have been no argument had that number been sought, at £330k a pop. That is, 13, plus hot rigs, reference rigs, deployed spares, sim, etc. A 13 aircraft fleet, and the IFF fit policy was Full Fleet Fit. I recall an aircraft programme in the 90s. ![]()
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